Introduction
We are concerned with a GI/M11/s queueing process where customers arrive at instants ro, Ir 
The GI/M/s/n Queue
Suppose now that the service facility has a limited waiting room of size n > 0. That is, there could be at most n + s customers in the system. An arrival balks with probability one if he finds that all the s servers and all the n waiting positions are occupied. Suppose also that customers who find the system in state i < s + n join the the queue with positive probability. From probabilistic point of view the physical limitation on the number of customers in the system is equivalent to a balking sequence for which 0 < Di < 1 for i < s + n and Di = 0for all i > s + n. A GI/M/s queueing process with such a balking sequence w,ill be denoted as a GlI/M/s/n queue.
As before, the GI/M1/s/n process may be imbedded at instants of arrival to yield a homogeneous Markov chain wlhose transition probabilities, {pij(n)}, are identical with those of the GI/MI/s queue except for the s + nth (= last) rowx of the transition matrix. We have: and the conditional expected waiting time is given by:
PROOF'. The proof is similar to the ones given in [15] and [18] for related models and therefore will be omitted.
REMARK. It is readily seen that results (6) and (7) may be extended to the GI/M/s process as well.
Two Imbedded Markov Chains
A slightly different avenue of approach for the analysis of the GI/M/s process with balking is to imbed it at instants of joining rather than at instants of arrival. This is the approach that was taken by Homma in [10] . Consider the limiting probabilities {7rj} (or { 7ri (n )} ) of the process imbedded at instants of arrival and let {Pj4 ({Pj (n ) }) denote the corresponding stationary limiting probabilities of the process imbedded at instants of joining; i.e., Pj is the probability that the system is in state j when joining occurs. We then have: THEOREM 2. Pi = Dj7rj/,iDi7r i for all j.
PROOF. Let Aj be the event, "An arrival finds the system in state j," and let C be the event, "An arrival joins the queue." Clearly, P (A j) = 7rj and P (C I Ai) = Dj.
Since the { Aj} 's form a partition of the sample space, and Pj = P (A, | C), the result follows immediately by using Bayes' theorem.
Note. Since ZiDi7ri < 1, Pj _ Djirj for every j, where equality holds if and only if Di = 1 for all i. In particular, if Dk < 1 for some k then Pj > Dj7rj for all relevant j. This is clearly the case for the GI/M/s/n process.
Customers' Optimal Joining Rules
We associate with our queueing process a linear cost-reward structure as follows: (i) A reward G ? 0 is obtained by each customer upon successful completion of his service.
(ii) A service charge (= toll) 0 is paid by the customer to the service agency for the service rendered.
(iii) The waiting costs for each arrival who joins the queue are incurred at the rate of c > 0 per unit time.
(iv) The decision to balk is accompanied with a fixed penalty 1. We let g = G-0 be the net reward of a customer who has been served and we let b = g + 1 be the benefit of a customer who joins the queue. In order to eliminate trivialities we assume that G, 0, C and 1 are finite and that b > c/,u. (This very last assumption will be clarified later.) Our objective now is to find rules that maximize the net benefit of the customers. We distinguish between two cases. (a) Self-optimization, i.e. every customer finds his own optimal "balking or joining" rule. (However, since G, 0, c and 1 are equal for all customers, the same optimal rule applies for all.) (b) Social (or public) optimization, i.e., we consider the long-run average expected net benefit of all customers and obtain the balking rule that maximizes this objective function.
MViore specific, a rule or policy, R, for controlling the system is a set of functions Before proceeding to find optimal joining rules we note that because of the Mlarkovian property of the service times reneging is never optimal; i.e., once having decided to join the queue it never pays to leave the system before service is completed.
Self-Optimization
We wish to find a rule R = DkR (. )} consisting of joining probabilities {DJR (Hm1 X i)} (recall that DR (. ) = 1-D1R (. )) such that for every history Hm_1 and every i 
n (s). The interpretation is obvious; the rule says: Join if and only if the number of customers in the system is less than the control limit, s + n (s).
As noted in [18] it is readily seen that the control limit rule (10) is independent of the arrival distribution. This is clearly understandable since each individual customer observes upon arrival only a "local" situation, i.e., the current state of the system, and is not interested in the forthcoming customers. However, if the arrival pattern is taken into consideration one might suspect that a better optimum a "global" onemay be achieved. This is indeed the case, as will be shown in the following section.
Public Optimization
Our objective now is to find a rule R which maximizes the long-ruin average expected net benefit of the entire customers' population. For anv given policy R and an initial state flo = j the expected net benefit at instant Tm is: We now show that the optimal rule for public optimization is a control limit rule with finite control limit, s + n (p), and that self-optimization need not bring upon social optimization. That is, we show that IRD+R As was pointed out in [18] , in most cases we will have n (p) < n (s) which implies that acting individually seldom optimizes public good. The new toll at the level of 0 + 0 will cause the selfish customers to act according to the overall optimal criteria, that is, their new control limit will be smaller and the (average) queue size will be reduced to the desired magnitude.
Station optimization may also be studied in the framework of a "competition" model between the service agency-which is then considered as a profit-making organization and the customers, whether acting individually or collectively. It is then assumed that the service agency's objective is to maximize its long-run average revenue, i.e., to find s+ SO as to maximize [1n-r (RD+ )]0 over all possible 0, where n is a function of 0 and is either n (s) or n (p). As in [18] it can be shown that the situation is analogous to the monopoly model of Price Theory where the "demand" function that is, n (s) or n (p )-is completely known to the service station-the monopolist-for any given 0.
